Non-dictatorial extensive social choice: a further observation by Kamaga Kohei
  
21COE-GLOPE Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
If you have any comment or question on the working paper series, please contact each author. 
When making a copy or reproduction of the content, please contact us in advance to request 
permission. The source should explicitly be credited. 
GLOPE Web Site: http://www.waseda.jp/prj-GLOPE/en/index.html
 
Non-dictatorial extensive social choice: 
a further observation 
 
 
 
 
Kohei Kamaga 
 
 
 
 
February 2007 
Revised August 2007 
 
 
Working Paper No. 12 
Non-dictatorial extensive social choice: a further observation¤
Kohei Kamaga†
Abstract
This paper examines social decision making involving individuals’ interpersonal comparisons
about the well-being of each member of them. Such a framework is usually called extensive social
choice and is regarded as the extension of the Arrovian social choice. In the literature, Kevin Roberts
(Rev Econ Stud 47: 409-420) obtained the Arrow-like impossibility result, i.e. the existence of a dic-
tatorial individual, under some moderate conditions. His result involves two serious impossibilities:
one is the impossibility of non-dictatorial, or anonymous, social decision making, and the other is that
of utilizing increased informational basis, i.e. individuals’ sympathetic evaluation on the well-being
of the others. In order to resolve this impossibility result, we relax the rationality requirement of so-
cial preferences from transitivity, which was assumed in Roberts’ analysis, into quasi-transitivity. We
show that, under moderate conditions, although it is still hardly possible to utilize the increased infor-
mational basis, a new anonymous collective choice rule, called lexical Pareto extension rule, can be
established by virtue of the enriched informational basis. However, we also prove that, under slightly
strengthened conditions, an admissible anonymous rule is solely the direct extension of the one ob-
tained in the Arrovian framework.
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1 Introduction
Extensive social choice considers the aggregation problem of individuals’ interpersonal comparisons. In
contrast to the Arrovian framework (Arrow 1963), in extensive social choice a social preference of alter-
natives is determined by aggregating individuals’ opinions not only about their own well-being but also
about the other individuals’ well-being in the alternatives. This extended framework can be traced back to
the classical work of Suppes (1966). In the literature, some impossibility results have been obtained (e.g.
Sen (1970), Roberts (1980, 1995), and Suzumura (1996)). Among these impossibilities, the most serious
one is the Arrow-like impossibility in Roberts (1980), which shows that the extension of the informa-
tional basis of social decision making does not help us to avoid Arrow’s negative conclusion. To resolve
Roberts’ impossibility result, three alternative routes were explored and some non-dictatprial possibili-
ties have been established; Ooghe and Lauwers (2005) and Kamaga (2007) considered cardinal or more
cardinal utility information such as translation-scale measurable or ratio-scale measurable utility; Ooghe
(2004) and also Ooghe and Lauwers (2005) analyzed social quasi-orderings, i.e. reﬂexive and transitive
social preferences; Gaertner (1992) dropped binary independence condition.
This paper explores an alternative resolution to Roberts’ impossibility in a different approach. In con-
trast to the three approaches above, we relax the rationality requirement of social preferences from tran-
sitivity into quasi-transitivity, and examine the possibility of non-dictatorial extensive social choice. Our
interest does not simply lie on a resolution to Roberts’ impossibility because, in the case of quasi-transitive
social preferences, the Pareto extension rule, which was established by Sen (1970) in the Arrovian frame-
work, can be directly reformulated as the non-dictatorial aggregation rule in this extended framework. The
main purpose of this paper is to give an answer to the following question; in this extended framework, is
it possible to ﬁnd a resolution to Roberts’ impossibility other than the direct reformulation of Sen’s Pareto
extension rule?
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents notation and deﬁnitions. In Section
3, we list some basic axioms. In addition to the extensions of usual axioms considered in the Arrovian
framework, we also provide an axiom which is based on the idea of anti-paternalism. Before proceeding
to the case of quasi-transitive social preferences, we discuss transitive social preferences and provide some
impossibility results in Section 4. These impossibility results will motivate us to consider quasi-transitive
social preferences. In Section 5, we examine the case of quasi-transitive social preferences. We especially
focus on the amount of preference information utilized to determine the social ranking and explore a
resolution to Roberts’ impossibility result. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let N be the ﬁnite set of n individuals. We assume n ¸ 2. The typical element of N is i, j, k, or l. X
is a ﬁnite set of social alternatives. We assume that it contains at least three alternatives, i.e. ]X ¸ 3.
For each x 2 X and each i 2 N, the pair (x; i) denotes i’s objective circumstance in x. For each i 2 N, let
R˜i denote i’s extended preference ordering deﬁned on X £N. We write (x; j)R˜i(y;k) to mean that to be
the individual j in the social state x is at least as good as to be the individual k in the state y according
to i’s opinion. In each individual’s extended preference ordering, preference information concerning the
individual’s own position, e.g. (x; i)R˜i(y; i), is referred to as individualistic preference information, and
similarly, preference information about some other individual, e.g. (x; j)R˜i(y; j) where i 6= j, is mentioned
as sympathetic preference information. Let R˜ be a proﬁle of n-tuple of extended preference orderings such
that R˜= (R˜1; R˜2; : : : ; R˜n). R˜ collects all logically possible extended preference orderings. B is the set of
all logically possible binary relations of X .
An aggregation rule, denoted f , is deﬁned as a mapping from the admissible set of proﬁles D µ R˜n
to a set of binary relations of X , i.e.
f :D ¡!B:
We call f collective choice rule. We write R f (R˜) as f (R˜) = R f (R˜), and Pf (R˜) (resp. I f (R˜)) as an asymmetric
(resp. a symmetric) part of R f (R˜). In Section 4, B is assumed to be the set of reﬂexive, complete, and
transitive binary relations of X , i.e. orderings of X , and in Section 5, transitivity is replaced with quasi-
transitivity.1 Note that quasi-transitivity is logically weaker than transitivity. Thus, in Section 5 we
consider a broader class of collective choice rules than in Section 4.
In order to make comparisons between the results in this extended framework with those in the Arro-
vian framework, we distinguish two types of collective choice rule according to the amount of preference
information utilized to determine the social ranking. We deﬁne A f as the set of collective choice rules
that satisfy the following property: 8x;y 2 X , 8R˜; R˜0 2D ,
[(w; i)R˜i(z; i), (w; i)R˜0i(z; i) 8i 2 N 8w;z 2 X ]) [xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y]:
This property can be called independence of sympathetic preference information. By deﬁnition, any rule
in A f generates the same social rankings for any two proﬁles which contain the same individualistic
preference information, and thus, eliminates the possible inﬂuence of sympathetic preference informa-
tion altogether. Since it might be possible to interpret that the Arrovian social choice is the framework
1Let R be a binary relation deﬁned on X . R satisﬁes; (i) reﬂexivity if and only if, 8x 2 X , xRx; (ii) completeness if and only
if, 8x;y 2 X with x 6= y, xRy or yRx; (iii) transitivity if and only if, 8x;y;z 2 X , [xRy and yRz]) xRz; (iv) quasi-transitivity if and
only if, 8x;y;z 2 X , [xPy and yPz]) xPz.
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which aims at aggregating the individualistic preference information, we call A f Arrovian subclass. Let
E f denote the set of all logically possible collective choice rules. Obviously, A f is a subclass of E f .
Every non-dictatorial rule established in the Arrovian framework can be directly reformulated as a col-
lective choice rules of the Arrovian subclass. Therefore, our interest especially lies on the possibility of
establishing a new non-dictatorial collective choice rule that belongs to E f nA f .
3 Basic axioms
We now introduce basic axioms. In extensive social choice, the extensions of the Arrovian axioms are
usually considered. We start with the following domain condition.
Unrestricted Domain (UD)
The domain of a collective choice rule, f , consists of all logically possible proﬁles, i.e. D = R˜n.
The collective choice rule satisfying UD is applicable in any society no matter how diverse the citizens’
opinions are. Note that, for any rule f in A f , this axiom prescribes the same requirement as the axiom of
unrestricted domain in the Arrovian social choice.
Next, we move to a pairwise independence axiom. The following axiom is the natural extension of the
independence axiom considered in the Arrovian social choice.
Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (BIIA)
8R˜; R˜0 2D , 8x;y 2 X , if (x; j)R˜i(y;k), (x; j)R˜0i(y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N, then xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y.
BIIA asserts that the social ranking of any two alternatives must be independent of the preference informa-
tion about the other alternatives. In other words, to determine the social ranking of any two alternatives,
we only have to consider the preference information about these two alternatives. Consequently, assuming
that a collective choice rule satisﬁes BIIA, a social preference relation on X can be constructed by apply-
ing each pairwise social decision making. Although BIIA is sometimes questioned in its parsimonious
attitude toward preference information, this axiom can be positively interpreted as a requirement of infor-
mational efﬁciency of collective decision making. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that to restrict the
amount of information utilized in the collective decision making may reduce an individual’s incentive to
strategically manipulate her/his preference.2 As in the discussion about UD, for any f 2A f , this binary
independence axiom can be considered as the same requirement as the pairwise independence condition
2On this issue see, for example, Craven (1992) chapter 5.
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of the Arrovian framework. This axiom is, however, a considerably weakened independence condition
for the rules of E f nA f because the coincidence of the individualistic preference information across two
different proﬁles is no longer sufﬁcient to ensure that we obtain the same social preferences in these two
proﬁles.
Next, we consider the following Paretian axioms.
Extensive Weak Pareto (EWP)
8R˜ 2D , 8x;y 2 X , if (x; j)P˜i(y; j) 8i; j 2 N, then xPf (R˜)y.
Weak Pareto (WP)
8R˜ 2D , 8x;y 2 X , if (x; i)P˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N, then xPf (R˜)y.
Strong Pareto (SP)
8R˜ 2D , 8x;y 2 X , if (x; i)R˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N, then xR f (R˜)y. Moreover, if there exists an individual j 2 N such
that (x; j)P˜j(y; j), then xPf (R˜)y.
Each of WP and SP is, respectively, a direct reformulation of the corresponding Pareto criterion con-
sidered in the Arrovian social choice. On the other hand, EWP is much weaker unanimity requirement
than WP for each rule of E f nA f . But, both of EWP and WP are logically equivalent for the rules in A f .
Finally, we introduce a requirement of anti-paternalism. Under the assumption of UD, there is no
guarantee that an individual’s, say j’s, sympathetic preference information about the welfare of some
other individual, say i, will completely coincide with i’s preference information concerning her/his own
position, i.e. i’s individualistic preference information. Thus, a conﬂict between these two preference
information may occur in this extended framework. Kamaga (2007) formulated the following axiom as
the resolution to such a conﬂicting situation.
Anti-paternalistic priority to Concerned Individual (APCI)
8R˜ 2 D , 8x;y 2 X , if there exist two distinct individuals i; j 2 N such that (x; i)P˜i(y; i), (y; i)P˜j(x; i), and
(x; l)I˜k(y; l) 8(k; l) 2 N£Nnf(i; i);( j; i)g, then xPf (R˜)y.
APCI is based on the idea of anti-paternalism. In the antecedent of APCI, we have a conﬂict of opin-
ions solely between i’s preference information about her/his own welfare and j’s sympathetic preference
information about i’s welfare. APCI asserts that, from a view point of anti-paternalism, the concerned
individual’s own opinion, i.e. i’s own opinion, should be given priority to determine the social ranking as
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s/he prefers.
In this paper, we will explore a logically admissible collective choice rule that satisﬁes UD, BIIA,
APCI, and one of the Paretian axioms, EWP, WP, or SP. Thus, we have three cases to be analyzed in
accordance with which of the Pareto criteria is actually imposed. The following lemma, however, tells
that we only have to consider only two of these three cases.3
Lemma 1. Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has the rangeB equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete,
and quasi-transitive binary relations of X, and that it satisﬁes UD, BIIA, and APCI. Then, f satisﬁes EWP
if and only if it satisﬁes WP.
Proof of Lemma 1.
It is obvious that WP implies EWP. We will prove that EWP now implies WP in the presence of the
other three axioms. Fix two distinct individuals i;m 2 N arbitrarily. Since ]N ¸ 2, we can always ﬁnd
such two individuals. For any pair of distinct alternatives x;y 2 X , we consider the following three sets of
proﬁles, Rxy, R¯xy, and Rˆxy:
Rxy = fR˜ 2 R˜n : (x; i)P˜j(y; i) 8 j 2 Nnfmg; (x; l)P˜k(y; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfigg:
R¯xy = fR˜ 2 R˜n : (x; i)P˜i(y; i); (x; l)P˜k(y; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfigg:
Rˆxy = fR˜ 2 R˜n : (x; j)P˜j(y; j) 8 j 2 Ng:
Note that Rˆxy is the set of all proﬁles that satisfy the antecedent of WP for the alternatives x and y, and
also that we have Rxy µ R¯xy µ Rˆxy. We will show, in three step, that xPf (R˜)y follows for any proﬁle in
each of the three sets of proﬁles. We begin with the most restricted case, i.e. the smallest set of proﬁles,
Rxy and complete the proof by examining the case of Rˆxy.
Step 1.
In this step, we show that xPf (R˜)y follows for any proﬁle in R
xy and any distinct alternatives x;y 2 X .
Choose any two distinct alternatives x;y 2 X and any proﬁle R˜ 2 Rxy. Let z be an alternative such that
z 6= x;y. We consider the proﬁle R˜1 2 R˜ that satisﬁes the following properties (i) to (vi):
(i) (x;k)R˜ j(y; l), (x;k)R˜1j(y; l) 8 j;k; l 2 N,
(ii) (x; l)P˜1k (z; l) 8k; l 2 N,
(iii) (z; i)P˜1i (y; i),
(iv) (y; i)P˜1m(z; i),
(v) (y; i)I˜1k (z; i) 8k 2 Nnfi;mg,
(vi) (y; l)I˜1k (z; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfig.
3This lemma is a non-welfarist analogue of Lemma 1 in Kamaga (2007).
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Since f satisﬁes UD, we can consider such a proﬁle R˜1. From (ii), we can apply EWP, and thus, we have
xPf (R˜1)z: (1)
From the properties (iii) to (vi), APCI gives
zPf (R˜1)y: (2)
Consequently, from (1) and (2), we obtain
xPf (R˜1)y (3)
by the quasi-transitivity of f (R˜1). Since the property (i) shows that the two proﬁles R˜ and R˜1 together
satisfy the antecedent of BIIA, we have xPf (R˜)y from (3) as desired.
Step 2.
This step proves that xPf (R˜)y follows for any proﬁle in R¯
xy and any distinct alternatives x;y 2 X . For
each pair of distinct alternatives x;y 2 X , we now deﬁne the following set of proﬁles using an integer t
with 2· t · n;
R¯xy(t) = fR˜ 2 R˜n :(x; i)P˜i(y; i);
(x; l)P˜k(y; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfig;
(x; i)P˜j(y; i) 8 j 2M ½ Nnfig with ]M = n¡ tg;
where the individual i is the same as deﬁned at the beginning of the proof. Note that, by deﬁnition,
Rxy µ R¯xy(t) µ R¯xy for all t with 2 · t · n, R¯xy(2) = Rxy, and R¯xy(n) = R¯xy. Thus, we have to show
that, 8R˜ 2 Rxy(n) 8x;y 2 X , xPf (R˜)y follows. In Step 1, we have just shown that xPf (R˜)y, 8R˜ 2 Rxy(2)
8x;y 2 X . We use the method of induction of t. Assume that we have xPf (R˜)y 8R˜ 2Rxy(t) with 2· t < n,
8x;y 2 X , and consider any distinct x;y 2 X and any R˜1 2 Rxy(t + 1). We want to show xPf (R˜1)y. Let
m¯ 2 NnM and m¯ 6= i, where M is the same set as in the deﬁnition of Rxy(t+1). By UD, we can ﬁnd the
following proﬁle R˜2 2 R˜n and z 6= x;y such that;
(i) (x;k)R˜1j(y; l), (x;k)R˜2j(y; l) 8 j;k; l 2 N,
(ii) (x; i)P˜2i (z; i),
(iii) (x; i)P˜2j (z; i) 8 j 2M[fm¯g,
(iv) (x; l)P˜2k (z; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfig,
(v) (z; i)P˜2i (y; i),
(vi) (y; i)P˜2m¯(z; i),
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(vii) (y; i)I˜2k (z; i) 8k 2 Nnfi; m¯g,
(viii) (y; l)I˜2k (z; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfig.
From the properties (v) to (viii), R˜2 satisﬁes the antecedent of APCI over the pair (y;z). Thus, we have
zPf (R˜2)y: (4)
Notice that, form the properties (ii) to (iv), the proﬁle R˜2 belongs to Rxz(t). Thus, by the assumption of
the induction method, we obtain
xPf (R˜2)z: (5)
Since f (R˜2) is quasi-transitive, we have
xPf (R˜2)y (6)
from (4) and (5). From the property (i) and (6), we obtain xPf (R˜1)y by BIIA. By the induction method, we
can complete this step.
Step 3.
In this step, we complete the proof. We deﬁne the following set of proﬁles for each pair of distinct
alternatives, x;y 2 X , using an integer t with 1· t · n;
Rˆxy(t) = fR˜ 2 R˜n :(x; i)P˜i(y; i) 8i 2M ½ N with ]M = t;
(x; l)P˜k(y; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 NnMg:
By deﬁnition, R¯xy µ Rˆxy(t) µ Rˆxy for any t with 1 · t · n, R¯xy = Rˆxy(1), and Rˆxy(n) = Rˆxy. Thus, we
have to show that 8R˜ 2 Rˆxy(n) 8x;y 2 X , xPf (R˜)y follows. Notice that this is true for the case of t = 1
from Step 2 because i and m were arbitrarily chosen at the beginning of the proof. As in Step 2, we use
the method of induction of t. Suppose that xPf (R˜)y 8R˜ 2 Rˆxy(t) with 1 · t < n, 8x;y 2 X , and consider
any distinct x;y 2 X and any R˜1 2 Rˆxy(t+1). We want to show xPf (R˜1)y. Let mˆ 2M, whereM is the same
set as in the deﬁnition of Rˆxy(t+1). We now consider the proﬁle R˜2 2 R˜n and z 6= x;y such that;
(i) (x;k)R˜1j(y; l), (x;k)R˜2j(y; l) 8 j;k; l 2 N,
(ii) (x; j)P˜2j (z; j) 8 j 2Mnfmˆg,
(iii) (x; l)P˜2k (z; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 N¯[fmˆg, where N¯ = NnM,
(iv) (z;m)P˜2m(y;m),
(v) (z; l)P˜2k (y; l) 8k 2 N 8l 2 Nnfmˆg.
By UD, such a proﬁle R˜2 is admissible now. From (ii) and (iii), R˜2 belongs to Rˆxz(t). Moreover, from (iv)
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and (v), it also be an element of Rˆzy(1). Therefore, by the assumption of the induction method, we have
xPf (R˜2)z (7)
and
zPf (R˜2)y: (8)
Since f (R˜2) is quasi-transitive, it follows from (7) and (8) that
xPf (R˜2)y: (9)
From (i) and (9), BIIA gives xPf (R˜1)y. By the induction method, the proof is completed now. ¥
From Lemma 1 and also the fact that SP implies APCI, we can focus our attention to the following
two cases;
Case 1: a collective choice rule f satisﬁes UD, BIIA, APCI, and EWP;
Case 2: a collective choice rule f satisﬁes UD, BIIA, and SP.
4 Transitive social preferences
In order to make clear our motivation to analyze the case of quasi-transitive social preferences, in this
section we show some results in the case of transitive social preferences. Throughout this section, we
assume that a collective choice rule f has a range B equal to the set of orderings of X . In this case,
Roberts (1980) obtained the following impossibility result.
Theorem 1. (Roberts (1980), Theorem 6)
Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has a range B equal to the set of orderings of X. If it satisﬁes
UD, BIIA, and WP, then there exists a dictator, i.e. there exists d 2 N such that;
8R˜ 2 R˜n; 8x;y 2 X ; (x;d)P˜d(y;d)) xPf (R˜)y:
Although WP is the direct reformulation of Arrow’s weak Pareto condition, it is not straightforward
that we obtain the same result as the Arrow’s impossibility in this extended framework because, under the
assumption of UD, BIIA is logically much weaker condition than the direct extension of the corresponding
independence condition considered in the Arrovian framework. Roberts’ result, however, shows that also
9
in this extended framework we are led to the Arrow-like impossibility.
From our Lemma 1 and Roberts’ impossibility theorem, we now immediately obtain the result that if
we relax WP into EWP but require the collective decision making to be anti-paternalistic in the sense that
APCI is satisﬁed, i.e. in Case 1, we inevitably have a dictatorial individual.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has a rangeB equal to the set of orderings of X. If
it satisﬁes UD, BIIA, APCI, and EWP, then there exists a dictator.
These two impossibility theorems motivate us to explore a resolution to these results. This is one reason
why we should examine the case of quasi-transitive social preferences.
We have another reason to explore the case of quasi-transitive social preferences. To make clear that,
we next consider Case 2. Since SP implies APCI and EWP, it is straightforward that also in this case we
have a dictatorial individual. Moreover, what is even worse, we obtain more serious impossibility result
than in Case 1. The following theorem shows that in Case 2 the logically admissible rule will be not only
dictatorial, but also informationally parsimonious in the sense that individualistic preference information
is solely utilized to determine the social ranking. To state the theorem, let N be the set of natural numbers
such that N = f1;2; : : : ;ng.
Theorem 3. If a collective choice rule, f , has a range B equal to the set of orderings of X, then it
satisﬁes UD, BIIA, and SP if and only if it is the lexical dictatorship, i.e. 8 R˜ 2 R˜n; 8x;y 2 X, there exists
a bijection t : N! N such that;
xPf (R˜)y,9k 2 N : (x;t(k))P˜t(k)(y;t(k)) and (x;t(l))I˜t(l)(y;t(l)) 8l < k;
xI f (R˜)y, (x; i)I˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N:
Theorem 3 tells that in Case 2 the admissible collective choice rule is solely the lexical dictatorship
that is a member of the Arrovian subclassA f . Thus, in this case we can never make use of the sympathetic
preference information, and thus, the extension of the informational basis completely loses its signiﬁcance.
To prove Theorem 3, we introduce the following property.
Pareto Indifference (PI)
8R˜ 2D , 8x;y 2 X , if (x; i)I˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N, then xI f (R˜)y.
It is obvious that SP implies PI. We now state the following lemmawhich shows that, in the presence of UD
and PI, the binary independence condition BIIA becomes logically equivalent to the direct reformulation
of the independence condition considered in the Arrovian framework.
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Lemma 2. Suppose a collective choice rule, f , has a range B equal to the set of orderings of X, and
satisﬁes UD, BIIA, and PI. Then, it satisﬁes the following property; 8R˜; R˜0 2 R˜n, 8x;y 2 X,
[(x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜0i(y; i) 8i 2 N]) [xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y]:
Proof of Lemma 2.
Choose any x;y 2 X , and any R˜; R˜0 2 R˜n such that (x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜0i(y; i) 8i 2 N. Consider the
alternative z 6= x;y and the following two proﬁles R˜1 and R˜2 such that;
(i) (x; j)R˜i(y;k), (x; j)R˜1i (y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(ii) (x; j)R˜1i (z;k), (x; j)R˜2i (z;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(iii) (x; j)R˜2i (y;k), (x; j)R˜0i(y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(iv) (y; i)I˜1i (z; i) 8i 2 N,
(v) (y; i)I˜2i (z; i) 8i 2 N.
Note that, by (i) and (iv), (x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜1i (z; i) 8i2N. Moreover, (ii) and (v) ensure that (x; i)R˜1i (z; i),
(x; i)R˜2i (y; i) 8i 2 N. Thus, by UD, we can ﬁnd R˜1 and R˜2. By BIIA,
xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜1)y:
PI gives yI f (R˜1)z. Thus, by the transitivity of f (R˜
1), we have
xR f (R˜1)y, xR f (R˜1)z:
Then, by BIIA,
xR f (R˜1)z, xR f (R˜2)z:
By PI, yI f (R˜2)z. The transitivity of f (R˜
2) gives
xR f (R˜2)z, xR f (R˜2)y:
By BIIA, we have
xR f (R˜2)y, xR f (R˜0)y:
Combining the equivalence assertions, we obtain
xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y:¥
In view of Lemma 2, Theorem 3 will immediately follow from Gevers’ (1979) characterization of the
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lexical dictatorship (his Theorem 2) in the Arrovian framework. Thus, we omit the proof of the theorem.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the transitivity of social indifference relations is deﬁnitely crucial
to establish this lemma. This observation motivates us to examine the case of quasi-transitive social
preferences where social indifference relations are no longer transitive. This is the second reason why we
should consider quasi-transitive social preferences.
5 Quasi-transitive social preferences
In this section we consider the case of quasi-transitive social preferences. In the Arrovian social choice,
it is well known that if we relax the requirement of transitivity into the quasi-transitivity we no longer
necessarily have a dictatorial individual but still have an oligarchy. An oligarchy is a decisive coalition
such that (i) the unanimous strict preferences of the members of the coalition will determine the social
strict preference, and (ii) every member of the coalition has a veto. In the framework of extensive social
choice, it is deﬁned as the following subset O µ N such that 8R˜ 2 R˜n, 8x;y 2 X ,
(i) [8i 2O : (x; i)P˜i(y; i)] ) xPf (R˜)y; and (ii) [9i 2O : (x; i)P˜i(y; i)]) xR f (R˜)y:
Our interest lies on whether or not we still necessarily have an oligarchy in Case 1 and/or in Case 2. The
following theorem shows that in Case 1, thus also in Case 2, we still inevitably have an oligarchy. This
means that it might be possible to resolve Roberts’ impossibility, but the resolution, if any, could hardly
utilize sympathetic preference information.
Theorem 4. Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has a rangeB equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete,
and quasi-transitive binary relations of X. If it satisﬁes UD, BIIA, EWP, and APCI, then there exists a
unique oligarchy.
To prove the theorem, we will use the extended version of Sen’s (1986) ﬁeld expansion lemma. To
state our extended ﬁeld expansion lemma, we need to introduce some additional deﬁnitions. We deﬁne
the set of individuals decisive over the ordered pair (x;y) 2 X £X , denoted D, if and only if, 8R˜ 2 R˜n,
xPf (R˜)y follows whenever (x; i)P˜i(y; i) 8i 2 D. The set of individuals is almost decisive over the ordered
pair (x;y) 2 X£X , denoted D¯, if and only if, 8R˜ 2 R˜n, xPf (R˜)y follows whenever (x; i)P˜i(y; i) 8i 2 D¯ and
(y; j)P˜j(x; j) 8 j 2 NnD¯. Note that both of the two properties are deﬁned only in terms of individualistic
preference information. Thus, the decisive individuals have such a strong power that their unanimous
strict preferences about their own positions will determine the social strict preference independently not
only of individualistic preference information of the rest of the individuals but also of every sympathetic
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preference information. This means, in turn, that the antecedent of this property can be considered to be
more demanding than the antecedent of the corresponding property deﬁned in the Arrovian framework.
The same argument can be applied to the property of almost decisiveness. Now, we are ready to state the
extended ﬁeld expansion lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has a rangeB equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete,
and quasi-transitive binary relations of X, and satisﬁes UD, BIIA, EWP, and APCI. For any (x;y)2 X£X,
if a set of individuals is almost decisive over (x;y), then this set must be decisive over every ordered pair
(a;b) 2 X£X.
Although Sen’s original ﬁeld expansion lemma is stated in the Arrovian framework, we can prove
our extended ﬁeld expansion lemma by the basically same argument as in Sen’s proof. The basic idea
is as follows. In the framework of extensive social choice, the proﬁles considered in Sen’s proof can be
reformulated by specifying only the individualistic preference information of extended preference order-
ings. By deﬁnition, in each individual’s extended preference ordering there exists at most one individual
who belongs to the group that is almost decisive over some arbitrary ordered pair. Thus, we can always
ﬁnd the proﬁle of extended preference orderings to which we can apply Sen’s original proof. To make
sure of this point, we now provide the proof for the case of four distinct alternatives, a, b, x, and y, i.e.
fa;bg\fx;yg= /0.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Let D¯ is the set of individuals that is almost decisive over (x;y). Choose any R˜ 2 R˜n such that
(a; i)P˜i(b; i) 8i 2 D¯. We want to show that aPf (R˜)b follows. We now consider the following proﬁle R˜1;
(i) (a; j)R˜i(b;k), (a; j)R˜1i (b;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(ii) (a; i)P˜1i (x; i)P˜
1
i (y; i)P˜
1
i (b; i) 8i 2 D¯, and
(iii) (a; j)P˜1j (x; j), (y; j)P˜
1
j (b; j), and (y; j)P˜
1
j (x; j) 8 j 2 NnD¯
It is obvious that we can ﬁnd the proﬁle satisfying both of the conditions (i) and (ii). We now check that
we can also ﬁnd the proﬁle that satisﬁes both of (i) and (iii). Since every individual’s extended preference
satisﬁes completeness, we have the following;
8 j 2 NnD¯, (a; j)P˜j(b; j) or (b; j)R˜ j(a; j).
If we have (a; j)P˜j(b; j), we can ﬁnd P˜1j such that
(iv) (a;k)R˜ j(b; l), (a;k)R˜1j(b; l) 8k; l 2 N, and
(v) (a; j)P˜2j (y; j)P˜
2
j (x; j)P˜
2
j (b; j).
Such an ordering R˜1j is well-deﬁned and it satisﬁes the conditions (i) and (iii). Next, we consider the case
where we obtain (b; j)R˜ j(a; j). In this case, we can ﬁnd R˜1j such that
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(vi) (a;k)R˜ j(b; l), (a;k)R˜1j(b; l) 8k; l 2 N, and
(vii) (y; j)P˜1j (b; j)R˜
1
j(a; j)P˜
1
j (x; j).
It is easily checked that R˜1j is well-deﬁned and it satisﬁes both of (i) and (iii). Therefore, we can always
ﬁnd the proﬁle R˜1. From Lemma 1, f now satisﬁes WP. Thus, by WP, we obtain aPf (R˜1)x and yPf (R˜1)b.
Since D¯ is almost decisive over (x;y), we have xPf (R˜1)y. By the quasi-transitivity of f (R˜1), aPf (R˜1)b. By
BIIA, we obtain aPf (R˜)b. ¥
The key in the above proof is that we only have to specify the individualistic preference information
in each individual’s extended preference ordering to invoke WP or the property of almost decisiveness.
This observation is still valid in the other cases where fa;bg\fx;yg 6= /0, and we omit the proofs of these
cases. We now provide the proof of Theorem 4. Making use of our extended ﬁeld expansion lemma, we
can prove Theorem 4 by a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 1 in Weymark (1984).
Proof of Theorem 4.
From Lemma 1, f satisﬁes WP. Thus, N is now the coalition that is decisive over any pair of alterna-
tives. Since N is the ﬁnite set of individuals, we must have the smallest decisive coalition GµN. We want
to show that G is an oligarchy. If ]G= 1, it is trivial. We prove the case of G¸ 2. Because of G’s decisive
property, we only have to show that every member of G has a veto. In other words, we want to show that
8R˜ 2 R˜n; 8x;y 2 X ; [9i 2 G : (x; i)P˜i(y; i)]) xR f (R˜)y:
To show this, choose any proﬁle R˜ and any alternatives x;y that satisfy the following condition; 9i 2 G
such that (x; i)P˜i(y; i). Since f (R˜) is complete, it is sufﬁcient to show that :yPf (R˜)x. We now consider the
following proﬁle R˜0 and z 6= x;y such that;
(i) (x; j)R˜i(y;k), (x; j)R˜0i(y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(ii) (x; i)P˜i(y; i)) (x; i)P˜0i (z; i)P˜0i (y; i), 8i 2 G,
(iii) (x; i)I˜i(y; i)) (x; i)I˜0i (y; i)P˜0i (z; i), 8i 2 G,
(iv) (y; i)P˜i(x; i)) (y; i)P˜0i (x; i)P˜0i (z; i), 8i 2 G,
(v) (z; i)P˜0i (y; i), 8i 2 NnG.
By UD, we can ﬁnd R˜0. If there is no individuals in G who satisﬁes the condition (iii) or (iv), :yP˜f (R˜)x
will travially follow from the decisiveness of G. Thus, we consider the case where such an individual in G
certainly exists. We prove by contradiction. Suppose yPf (R˜)x. Then, by BIIA, we have yPf (R˜0)x. Since G
is a decisive coalition, xPf (R˜0)z follows. The quasi-transitivity of f (R˜0) gives yPf (R˜0)z. Notice that we have
no speciﬁcation on R˜0 over (y;z) except the individualistic preference information over (y;z). Thus, from
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Lemma 3, it must be that the coalition of the individuals who satisﬁes the condition (iii) or (iv) is decisive.
This contradicts the assumption that G is the smallest decisive coalition. Therefore, we obtain :yPf (R˜)x.
The uniqueness of an oligarchy can be easily checked as follows. If we have two oligarchies O and O 0,
then, assuming R˜ be such that (x; i)P˜i(y; i) 8i 2O and (y; j)P˜j(x; j) 8 j 2O 0nO , we will obtain xPf (R˜)y and
yR f (R˜)x, which contradicts the completeness of f (R˜). ¥
Although an oligarchy has a strong decisive power, it is compatible with a requirement of anonymity
if the coalition is the whole set of the individuals, i.e. O = N. An axiom of anonymity can be formalized
as follows.
Anonymity (A)
8R˜; R˜0 2D , 8x;y2X , if there exists a permutation ofN, denoted s , such that (x; j)R˜i(y;k), (x;s( j))R˜0s(i)(y;s(k))
8i; j;k 2 N, then xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y.
This axiom asserts that names of the individuals have no affect on social decision making.
Sen’s (1970) well-established non-dictatorial rule, called the Pareto extension rule, can be directly
reformulated as an anonymous collective choice rule of the Arrovian subclass. We provide the following
example.
Example 1. The Pareto extension rule.
Sen’s Pareto extension rule can be reformulated as the following collective choice rule, f 2A f ;
8 R˜ 2D ; 8x;y 2 X ; xR f (R˜)y, [9i 2 N : (x; i)P˜i(y; i)] or [8i 2 N : (x; i)R˜i(y; i)]:
By deﬁnition, f has a rangeB equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete, and quasi-transitive binary relations
of X . The decisive coalition is now the whole set of the individuals N. It is easily checked that the Pareto
extension rule satisﬁes UD, BIIA, APCI, EWP, A, and moreover, SP. ¥
Since the Pareto extension rule belongs to the Arrovian subclass, it determines the social ranking by
solely utilizing the individualistic preference information of the decisive coalition N. Although this rule
can be the resolution to Roberts’ impossibility result, it still be considered as an impossibility result in the
sense that this rule eliminates the possible inﬂuence of the sympathetic preference information altogether
and thus the extension of the informational basis now completely loses its signiﬁcance. Now, the question
to be answered is whether or not we can obtain any other resolution in this extended framework. While
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Theorem 4 tells that it is hardly possible to utilize the sympathetic preference information, we can ﬁnd the
resolution that makes use not only of the individualistic preference information but also of the sympathetic
one, i.e. f 2 E f nA f . We now provide the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a collective choice rule f 2 E f nA f that has a range B equal to the set of
reﬂexive, complete, and quasi-transitive binary relations of X, and satisﬁes UD, BIIA, APCI, EWP, and A.
This proposition can be proved by the following example.
Example 2. The lexical Pareto extension rule.
We can deﬁne the following collective choice rule f 2 E f nA f ;
8R˜ 2 R˜n; 8x;y 2 X ,
(i) if there exists i 2 N such that (x; i)P˜i(y; i) or (y; i)P˜i(x; i), then;
xR f (R˜)y , [9i 2 N such that (x; i)P˜i(y; i)] or [(x; i)R˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N];
(ii) if (x; i)I˜i(y; i), 8i 2 N, then;
xR f (R˜)y , [9 j 2 N such that (x; j)P˜i(y; j); j 6= i] or [(x; j)R˜i(y; j) 8i; j 2 N; j 6= i]:
It is easily checked that f (R˜) satisﬁes reﬂexivity, completeness, and quasi-transitivity, and also that f
satisﬁes UD, BIIA, APCI, EWP, and A, but violates SP. ¥
By deﬁnition, the lexical Pareto extension rule is more likely to generate social strict preferences than
the Pareto extension rule. Thus, this new rule shows a slight improvement on the shortcoming of the
Pareto extension rule that social indifference relations are obtained in most case. Although it is just a
slight improvement, it will allow us to consider the reﬁnement of socially best alternatives, usually called
a maximal set. For each collective choice rule f , each non-empty set of alternatives S, and each proﬁle
R˜ 2 R˜n, the maximal set denoted M(S; f (R˜)) is deﬁned as follows:4
M(S; f (R˜)) = fx 2 S : :yPf (R˜)x 8y 2 Sg:
4One related but slightly different notion of socially best alternatives is the greatest set G deﬁned as, given a non-empty set
of alternatives S and a social preference relation f (R˜), G(S; f (R˜)) = fx 2 S : xR f (R˜)y 8y 2 Sg. For any subset S µ X and any
binary relation R on X , the maximal set contains the greatest set but the converse assertion does not necessarily hold in general.
However, if the binary relation R is reﬂexive and complete, these two sets always coincide (on this see, for example, Suzumura
(1983)). Thus, it does not matter which of the two different notions we adopt here. In the case of reﬂexive and complete binary
relations, the greatest set is sometimes referred to as maximal set (for example, in Austen-Smith and Banks (2000)).
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Let f PE be the Pareto extension rule, and also f LPE be the lexical Pareto extension rule. On the maximal
sets of these two rules, we obtain the following result;
8R˜ 2 R˜n; 8Sµ X (S 6= /0); M(S; f LPE(R˜))µM(S; f PE(R˜)):
Thus, it can be said that the lexical Pareto extension rule is more selective than the Pareto extension rule.
Next, we move to Case 2. In the case of transitive social preferences, we know from our Lemma 2 that
it is impossible to utilize the sympathetic preference information. But, as we noted earlier, the transitivity
of indifference relations is crucial to establish the lemma. Thus, this lemma can not be directly applied
to the case of quasi-transitive social preferences. The following lemma, however, tells that if we relax
transitivity into quasi-transitivity but strengthen PI to SP, we must obtain the same result.
Lemma 4. Suppose that a collective choice rule, f , has a rangeB equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete,
and quasi-transitive binary relations of X, and satisﬁes UD, BIIA, and SP. Then, 8R˜; R˜0 2 R˜n; 8x;y 2 X,
[(x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜0i(y; i) 8i 2 N]) [xR f (R˜)y, xR f (R˜0)y]:
Proof of Lemma 4.
Consider any two proﬁles R˜; R˜0 2 R˜n such that (x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜0i(y; i) 8i 2 N. Since the social
preferences satisfy completeness, it is sufﬁcient to show that (a) [xPf (R˜)y, xPf (R˜0)y] and (b) [yPf (R˜)x,
yPf (R˜0)x]. We ﬁrst consider (a). Assume xPf (R˜)y. Notice that if xPf (R˜)y holds then, by SP, R˜ never be
the situation such that (x; i)I˜i(y; i) 8i 2 N. We will show that xPf (R˜0)y follows. Choose any z 6= x;y, and
consider any R˜1 that satisﬁes the following conditions;
(i) (x; j)R˜i(y;k), (x; j)R˜1i (y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(ii) (x; i)P˜i(y; i)) [(x; i)P˜1i (y; i) and (y; i)P˜1i (z; i)], 8i 2 N,
(iii) (x; i)I˜i(y; i)) [(x; i)I˜1i (y; i) and (y; i)I˜1i (z; i)], 8i 2 N,
(iv) (y; i)P˜i(x; i)) [(y; i)P˜1i (z; i) and (z; i)P˜1i (x; i)], 8i 2 N.
By UD, R˜1 does certainly exist. By BIIA and SP, we have xPf (R˜1)y and yPf (R˜1)z. Thus, the quasi-
transitivity of f (R˜1) gives xPf (R˜1)z. Note that the conditions (ii)-(iv) and the transitivity of the individuals’
extended preferences ensure that (x; i)R˜i(y; i), (x; i)R˜1i (z; i) 8i2N. Next, we consider the following pro-
ﬁle R˜2 and z 6= x;y;
(v) (x; j)R˜1i (z;k), (x; j)R˜2i (z;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(vi) (x; j)R˜2i (y;k), (x; j)R˜0i(y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N,
(vii) (x; i)P˜1i (z; i)) [(x; i)P˜2i (z; i) and (z; i)P˜2i (y; i)], 8i 2 N,
(viii) (x; i)I˜1i (z; i)) [(x; i)I˜2i (z; i) and (z; i)I˜2i (y; i)], 8i 2 N,
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(ix) (z; i)P˜1i (x; i)) [(z; i)P˜2i (y; i) and (y; i)P˜2i (x; i)], 8i 2 N.
Note that nothing is speciﬁed about R˜1 over (x;z) except for individualistic preference information. Hence,
assume that (x; j)R˜2i (z;k), (x; j)R˜2i (y;k) 8i; j;k 2 N, then it is easily checked that, by UD, we can ﬁnd
the proﬁle. By BIIA and SP, we have xPf (R˜2)z and zPf (R˜2)y. Since f (R˜2) is quasi-transitive, we obtain
xPf (R˜2)y. Then, by BIIA, we obtain xPf (R˜0)y. The same argument can be applied to the proof of the inverse
direction of case (a), and also to the case (b). ¥
In view of Lemma 4, f satisﬁes the binary independence axiom which is the same as the direct refor-
mulation of the corresponding axiom considered in the Arrovian framework. Thus, we can directly apply
Weymark’s (1984) Theorem 2, and immediately obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. If a collective choice rule, f , has a range B equal to the set of reﬂexive, complete, and
quasi-transitive binary relations of X, then it satisﬁes UD, BIIA, SP, and A if and only if it is the Pareto
extension rule.
Theorem 5 establishes the characterization of the Pareto extension rule in this extended framework. In
view of this theorem, it can be said that while in Case 1 it is possible to consider an anonymous rule other
than the Pareto extension rule, in Case 2 the Pareto extension rule is the solely admissible anonymous rule.
In other words, even though we relax transitivity into quasi-transitivity, we must go back to the Arrovian
framework in Case 2.
6 Conclusion
This paper explored an anonymous collective choice rule under the extended informational basis involving
individuals’ sympathies for others. Such an informational basis is regarded as the extension of the one
considered in the Arrovian framework. In this paper, we in particular focused on quasi-transitive social
preferences, i.e. the logically weaker assumption of rationality of social preferences than in the usual cases
where transitivity is assumed to be satisﬁed.
Although in this extended framework we obtained the similar result to the Arrovian framework, it
was shown that it is now possible to consider a new non-dictatorial rule, the lexical Pareto extension rule,
by virtue of the extended informational basis. This new rule utilizes individuals’ sympathetic preference
information in the second step of its lexical decision ﬂow. This rule is more selective than the Pareto
extension rule, and thus, it will generate more selected socially best alternatives. Therefore, it can be said
that the extension of the informational basis will help us to improve the selectiveness of social decision
making.
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On the other hand, we also obtained the result that if we consider the direct extension of the strong
Pareto of the Arrovian framework, the Pareto extension rule is only one admissible rule that satisﬁes
anonymity and other moderate conditions. Hence, in this case we must go back to the Arrovian framework
and the extension of the informational basis completely loses its signiﬁcance.
In this paper, the axiomatization of the lexical Pareto extension rule was not explored. This compli-
cated but much interesting task is left for the future work.
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